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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * 
CINDY DUBOIS, ) 
) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) Appeal No. 920649-CA 
vs. ) 
) (Oral Argument 
GRAND CENTRAL d/b/a ) Priority No. 16) 
FRED MEYER, ) 
Defendant-Appellee. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
I. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely 
determinative of the outcome of this case. 
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II. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION? 
The first paragraph of the conclusion of Fred Meyer set 
forth on page 25 of its brief specifically and clearly identifies 
the main issue in this case and the reason that this issue was not 
properly decided below. 
Fred Meyer admits (See Fred Meyer brief, page 25) that 
the Trial Court was to consider whether Fred Meyer violated its 
employment contract with Ms. Dubois. Fred Meyer admits an 
employment contract exists, that the contract had substantive 
requirements but that it did not have procedural requirements. 
However, Fred Meyer then makes a substantial factual and 
evidentiary burden error with which the Trial Court unfortunately 
agreed, but which was wrong for purposes of a summary judgment 
decision. The contract in question admittedly had no procedural 
requirements regarding an employee's termination. Fred Meyer's 
alleged factual showing, which was contested by Ms. Dubois (R. at 
140-190), was found by the Trial Court as sufficient in an unstated 
way, so the Court would not review whether Fred Meyer's factual 
showing was reasonable, accurate or even consisted of false or 
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imaginary facts and refused Ms. Dubois an evidentiary hearing as 
to the reasonableness of such facts. 
In its conclusion at page 25 of its brief, Fred Meyer 
makes the allegation that "Fred Meyer clearly possessed sufficient 
information to support its decision to terminate Plaintiff. 
...Fred Meyer's decision, properly supported, cannot be second 
guessed by Utah Courts." 
The above stated conclusion focuses on the reason that 
the motion for summary judgment by Fred Meyer was improperly 
granted by the Trial Court. Whether Fred Meyer clearly possessed 
sufficient information also is a question of fact that was 
contested by Ms. Dubois (R at 140-191), but was decided against 
her without the taking of evidence. 
The trial court imposed its own view, or Fred Meyer's, 
of the facts in the motion for summary judgment, contrary to the 
standard for a summary judgment which is that the court must view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep 15 (Utah 
1992); and Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 208 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Additionally, Fred Meyer claims 
that its decision was "properly supported" and the court accepted 
this position by ruling in Fred Meyer's favor regarding the 
contested facts. 
It is a question of fact as to whether anything was 
properly supported by Fred Meyer or, as Ms. Dubois alleges, whether 
the decision was not properly supported and all of the Fred Meyer 
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decision making employees simply went along, without any 
independent investigation, with one employee's improperly supported 
decision. All Fred Meyer's employees except one relied on hearsay 
for their decision to terminate. Then these disputed issues of 
fact were decided in the moving party's favor (Fred Meyer's) by the 
Trial Court. This is a violation of the standard of summary 
judgment motions and is reversible error. 
A careful review of the order entered by the Trial Court 
(R. at 312-315) clearly indicates that several of its findings are 
based upon the court viewing contested evidence and resolving that 
evidence in favor of the moving party. See specifically paragraphs 
1, 3, and 4 (R. at 313). 
The Trial Court was wrongly convinced by Fred Meyer that 
the obligation of the court in reviewing an employee's alleged 
wrongful termination is not to provide an employee the opportunity 
to have the facts of the decision to terminate litigated, but 
rather to create a new legal standard whereby the employer prevails 
if it claims it has made a "reasonable" investigation of the 
circumstances. Fred Meyer would have this legal standard hold, 
that if an employer makes such an allegation, of "reasonable 
inquiry", the trial court will ignore the facts and accept the 
investigation of the employer at face value, whether reasonable or 
not, and without permitting the reasonableness of that 
investigation to be submitted to a finder of fact. 
Fred Meyer relies on the Russell v. Ogden, Union Ry & 
Depot Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952), case to support its decision. 
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That case does not make the finding argued by Fred Meyer. In the 
Russell case, the court found that a due process hearing had 
occurred prior to making the termination decision at which hearing 
evidence was presented to an impartial finder of fact. No such 
hearing ever occurred in the extant case and therefore no 
similarity with the Russell case exists. 
Fred Meyer admits this is the case on page 14 of its 
brief and makes the unjustifiable, and nonsensical leap that the 
employer's investigating employee(s) can be the "impartial" trier 
of fact for due process purposes and somehow make an impartial 
decision. Fred Meyer argues that its investigating employees are 
the ones who conducted the fair and impartial hearing and that Ms. 
Dubois had no right to challenge their findings in front of an 
impartial hearing officer. Nothing could be more unfair. 
The arguments Fred Meyer sets forth on pages 14 and 15 
of its brief are so laced with contested facts and procedural 
unfairness or at the very least incompleteness, that to permit the 
trial court decision to stand in this case would create substantive 
law in the State of Utah that is both procedurally unsound and 
fundamentally unfair as to a person's due process rights to have 
their claims heard by a fair and impartial finder of fact. The 
constitution of the State of Utah does not permit this. See Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 7. Of course Fred Meyer wishes 
that no employee would have access to a finder of fact relative to 
a decision to terminate under its employee contracts. Every 
employer in the world wants the same decision. If this Utah court 
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makes such a decision, it will be a tragic day for the meager 
workers rights that do exist in our state. 
Just the citing of all the facts that have to be agreed 
upon, as set forth on pages 15 through 17 of Fred Meyer's brief, 
as well as those set forth and argued by Ms. Dubois (R. at 140-190) 
indicate a substantial number of contested facts which the trial 
court decided completely in the moving party's favor. Ms. Dubois 
is at least entitled to have a fair and impartial hearing in front 
of an independent finder of fact to determine if the Fred Meyer 
investigation was reasonable. If it was not reasonable, she was 
wrongfully terminated and her claims should be compensated. To 
deny her the opportunity to prove that the investigation and 
actions of Fred Meyer were unreasonable is a fundamental denial of 
Ms. Dubois rights of due process, her rights under any reasonable 
reading of the contract drafted by Fred Meyer and should not be 
permitted. 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET 
FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER? 
In this summary judgment proceeding, Fred Meyer argues 
the contested facts of the case, claiming that they clearly show 
there is neither outrageous nor intolerable conduct on their part. 
See Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), and Samms v. 
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961). The Trial Court accepted the 
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views of Fred Meyer regarding the myriad contested facts in making 
it's decision to dismiss. Without viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff (the non-moving party) and making 
specific findings on those issues, the Plaintiff has no way of 
presenting her case to an independent finder of fact to determine 
if there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury. All that exists 
is the record of contested facts submitted in the respective 
memoranda of each party. 
All of the facts upon which Fred Meyer relied in making 
its termination decision, except those stated by Mr. Jones, are 
based upon inadmissible hearsay evidence (R. at 140-190). 
Therefore, the decision to dismiss her was not based upon a 
reasonable investigation, if the facts are viewed in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Dubois. 
In fact, Fred Meyer came up with an after the fact 
explanation of a "shell" computer which was never presented in its 
termination decision to Ms. Dubois (R. at 141-144) to cover up the 
real reason why Ms. Dubois was terminated, whatever that reason 
was. The court must be careful not to subsume such claims into 
other related claims. See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. 200 
Utah Adv. Rep 15, 19 (Utah 1992). 
Not permitting Ms. Dubois' case to be heard by an 
independent finder of fact denies her the opportunity to have a 
finder of fact determine if the conduct of Fred Meyer was 
outrageous and extreme. The Trial Court's suggestion that the 
firing had to be some kind of pre-textual firing and evidence of 
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that was required is not a rule set forth in the cases of this 
state and not in and of itself the only reason on which the 
termination decision could have occurred. Fred Meyer's actions 
could have occurred simply to cover up the bad decisions of the 
Fred Meyer employees, their failure to properly investigate or 
failure to be fundamentally fair towards Ms. Dubois in 
investigating her side of the story. Reasonable minds could find 
such actions to be outrageous behavior on Fred Meyer's part towards 
Ms. Dubois, and could be sufficient to meet the test of the cases 
set forth above. To deny Ms. Dubois the right to go to an 
independent finder of fact on those issues again procedurally is 
permitting the trial court to adopt the view of the facts most 
favorable to the moving party versus the non-moving party, which 
is a fundamental error in making summary judgment decisions. See 
Russell v. Thomson, supra. 
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING REGARDING THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER? 
This specific issue deals with whether or not an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in Utah relative to 
those provisions that do exist under an implied-in-fact employment 
contract. Such an agreement has been admitted to exist in this 
case. The question is does Fred Meyer have an obligation to act 
in good faith and deal fairly relative to the terms of an 
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employment agreement regarding termination, and is there a specific 
cause of action in Utah for such in Utah. This is a very narrow 
issue, specific to the facts of this case. It is a different issue 
than that decided in the cases of Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 194 Utah 
Adv. Rep 20 (Utah 1992), Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 55 (Utah 
1991), Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989) and 
Sandstrom v. First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah 1992) 
This issue is a legal decision and this Court must review 
it for correctness. 
The Trial Court likely justified its decision based on 
the general rule of no implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing in employment-at-will relationships under current Utah law. 
However, in this case the fact that it is agreed and admitted by 
Fred Meyer that an employment contract was in force between the 
parties relative to the termination without notice provision of 
such employment contract, creates an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing as to the particular provisions of a contract that 
does in fact exist. Otherwise, Fred Meyer can act with impunity 
and in bad faith towards the contract and the employee would have 
no recourse. If the employee has no recourse for the bad faith 
actions of the employer relative to the terms of an extent 
employment contract, the employee effectively has no contract. 
This would negate the existence of an employment agreement such as 
the one present in this case. Employees in the State of Utah 
should not be treated so poorly. 
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D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR SLANDER BASED 
SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER? 
In Fred Meyer's brief on this issue, it only reiterated 
the fact that there is a contested factual basis for arguing that 
there either was no conditional privilege or that there was malice 
involved relative to the spreading of the termination information 
about Ms. Dubois. 
Ms. Dubois asserted as facts (R. at 140-190) that 
information was communicated among various Fred Meyer employees 
not necessarily relative to the decision to terminate Ms. Dubois. 
In fact it was communicated even prior to the time that Ms. Dubois 
had been able to present her side of the story in the termination 
meeting. (R. at 157) If the decision to terminate her had been 
made prior to the meeting or prior to gathering the facts, how 
could it be a privileged communication, that she specifically was 
going to be terminated because of this problem? The timing of Fred 
Meyer is out of sequence for its argument and with the trial court 
effectively denying Ms. Dubois' opportunity to prove to a finder 
of fact whether or not the actions to terminate her were 
reasonable, the Trial Court's decision has now additionally 
validated the communications about such decisions to terminate, 
eventhough such communications were based upon facts that Ms. 
Dubois both contests, but is unable to present to an independent 
finder of fact. This is a grossly unfair result. 
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The Trial Court's decision on the issue of defamation, 
coupled with its decision to deny Ms. Dubois the procedural due 
process opportunity to contest Fred Meyer's wrongful termination, 
have effectively totally and completely denied Ms. Dubois due 
process to have an independent finder of fact review the actions 
of Fred Meyer under the facts of this case. Ms. Dubois cannot put 
on evidence before an independent fact finder to prove a lack of 
reasonableness, to prove outrageous conduct, to prove bad faith or 
prove lack of malice. Employees clearly have absolutely no rights 
in Utah, whether or not a contract exists. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court has created a legal and factual scenario 
in the State of Utah whereby an employee can be terminated without 
ever having his or her claims of unreasonableness in the 
termination decision, based upon a contract, reviewed by an 
independent finder of fact. Utah now has given employers the 
opportunity, with impunity, to spread among its various employees 
whatever it wishes to spread in terms of statements concerning the 
grounds for termination, without ever having such termination 
grounds reviewed by an independent finder of fact and the employee 
has no legal recourse to correct the situation. This is a sad 
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state of legal affairs relative to human, employee and due process 
rights in our state. 
This court must make a decision that an employee under 
an employment agreement such as one that exists in this case at 
least has the right to a fair and impartial hearing in front of an 
independent finder of fact as to the reasonableness of the 
employer's actions in its termination decisions. Without at least 
that much of an opportunity to present his or her case, employees 
will have no rights under any contracts. If our Courts do not 
provide that minimum opportunity, this Court should give up the 
sham attempt to call such termination policies as exist in this 
case, contracts, but rather call it something closer to reality, 
such as a wish list an employer can use against their employees in 
Utah when they desire to terminate them and want the last word. 
DATED this J?%ftjiaY of Ayh^t I , 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bigelow 
Attorney for Appellant 
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